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Abstract. Franz Brentano is well known for highlighting the importance of intentionality, 
but he said curiously little about the nature of intentionality. According to Mark Textor, 
there is a deep reason for this: Brentano took intentionality to be a conceptual primitive 
the nature of which is revealed only in direct grasp. Although there is certainly textual 
support for this interpretation, it appears in tension with Brentano’s repeated attempts 
to analyze intentionality in terms of ‘notional constituents’ – aspects which cannot come 
apart in reality but which can be conceptually distinguished. After bringing out this 
tension, I explore some options for resolving it, ultimately offering my own favored 
interpretation.  
 
I. Intentionality Primitivism and Revelation  
 
Brentano is well known for arguing that intentionality is fundamental to mentality: it is 
what makes mental phenomena mental. But what is the nature of intentionality itself? 
Brentano says very little on this, and subsequent attempts at capturing the nature of 
intentionality have consistently run into difficulties. Three broad approaches may be 
discerned here: Chisholm’s conceptual-analysis approach, the naturalist-externalist 
research program so prominent in late twentieth-century philosophy of mind, and the 
phenomenal-intentionality research program that has flourished more recently.  
 Chisholm (1957) offered a conceptual analysis of intentionality in the ‘formal 
mode of speech.’ The approach may be factorized into two components. First, 
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intentional properties are properties picked out by intensional verbs. Second, 
intensional verbs are verbs that do not support certain inferences which other verbs do 
support, notably existential generalization (‘a is F, therefore there is an x such that x is 
F’) and truth-preserving substitution of co-referential terms (‘a is F, a = b, therefore b is 
F’).  
The main problem with this ‘analysis’ is that it really tells us nothing about the 
nature of intentionality itself – all it does is offer (allegedly) reliable linguistic symptoms 
that we might use to tell when a property is intentional. What we learn here is that 
intentionality is whatever underlies certain inferential failures. But we learn nothing 
about the nature of that which underlies these failures.  
 Dretske (1981), Millikan (1984), and Fodor (1990) are some of the heroes of a 
monumental achievement of late twentieth-century philosophy of mind: the 
identification of several candidate highly specific relations, all ‘naturalistically kosher,’ 
that connect brain states with environmental conditions. These relations were offered as 
capturing the ‘underlying nature’ of intentionality, such that theses of the form 
‘intentionality is nothing but natural relation R’ putatively constituted Kripkean 
necessary a posteriori truths.  
The main problem with this program is that it never managed to produce a 
satisfactory account of misrepresentation and other cases of ‘intentional inexistence’ 
(e.g., imaginative representation). My own view, which I will not argue for here (but see 
Kriegel 2011 Ch.3) is that this repeated failure is due to the simple fact that in some 
cases of misrepresentation there is nothing for us to stand in any relation to, natural or 
otherwise.  
 According to the phenomenal intentionality program, intentionality (or at least 
‘underived’ intentionality),1 is a phenomenal feature of conscious experiences. If this is 
right, then the nature of intentionality is a phenomenal, qualitative nature. How might 
we go about trying to capture theoretically this kind of phenomenal nature? Elsewhere 
in the philosophy of consciousness, we often use the method of phenomenal contrast: 
we juxtapose experiences which exhibit the relevant phenomenal feature with 
experiences that differ only in failing to exhibit that feature. Something like this is tried 
for intentionality, for instance, by Farid Masrour (2013), who contrasts experiences that 
exhibit what he calls ‘objectual unity structure’ with experiences that do not.  
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One problem with this approach, however, is that intentionality is quite likely an 
invariant feature of all experiences. If so, there is no hope for a contrast between 
experiences that exhibit it and ones that do not. There may be a contrast between 
experiences and things that are not experiences, of course, and intentionality may 
prove to occur only on the side of experience. But even if this turns out to be the case, 
there is no reason to suppose that the presence or absence of intentionality is the only 
difference there. Even Brentano, renowned for taking intentionality to be the mark of 
the mental, recognized five other systematic differences between experiences and 
things that are not experiences (see Brentano 1874 Bk. II Ch.1).  
Some authors have claimed that Brentano himself was a proponent of 
phenomenal intentionality (Potrč 2002, Dewalque 2013). I agree: for Brentano, 
intentionality is not some theoretical posit of ‘folk’ or scientific psychology, but a kind of 
felt endogenous directedness manifest in conscious experience (Kriegel 2018: 52-3). 
Given that Brentano takes intentionality to be a phenomenal constant in our conscious 
life, he faces the problem that phenomenal contrast is unavailable to bring out the 
nature of intentionality (a problem he was well aware of – see Brentano 1982: 63). How, 
then, might he go about offering an informative account of the nature of intentionality? 
Curiously, although Brentano is well known for highlighting the importance of 
intentionality, there is next to nothing in the Brentanian corpus on the nature of 
intentionality. What are we to make of this?  
Mark Textor (2017 Ch.3) offers a brilliant explanation: Brentano held a 
combination of two fascinating theses that make a substantive, informative account of 
the nature of intentionality both ‘impossible’ and ‘superfluous’ (2017: 73-4). The first 
thesis is ‘intentionality primitivism’: intentionality is conceptually primitive and thus 
unanalyzable. The second is a revelation thesis: ‘intentionality is fully revealed to us in 
its instantiation,’ in that ‘we know what intentionality is by attending to our mental life 
and comparing and contrasting it with physical objects guided by metaphorical 
prompters’ (2017: 74, 73; my italics). Textor’s idea is that primitivism makes a 
substantive account of intentionality impossible, while revelationism makes it 
superfluous.  
We can see what Brentano may have in mind here by considering paradigmatic 
versions of primitivism and revelationism.  
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 Consider first Moore’s (1903) primitivism about goodness. The goal of Moore’s 
open-question argument was to show that the notion of goodness is ‘elemental’: it 
cannot be analyzed into more basic constituents. Suppose I tell you that Jimmy is a 
bachelor, and when you express skepticism, I establish to your satisfaction that he is 
both a man and unmarried. You cannot sensibly ask ‘yes, but is he a bachelor?’ In 
contrast, for any combination of features F, G, …, claims Moore, I can establish to your 
satisfaction that democracy (say) is F, G, … and you could still perfectly sensibly ask 
‘yes, but is democracy good?’ For Brentano, the same holds of intentionality. For any 
features F, G, …, we may ask of anyone or anything that features them ‘Yes, but does 
he/she/it enjoy that endogenous directedness distinctive of conscious experience?’ 
Thus an open-question argument can be run about intentionality that would 
demonstrate its unanalyzability. And indeed, in a little-read manuscript published 
almost 40 years after his death, we find Brentano claiming that like all other elemental 
notions/features (elementaren Begriffe/Merkmale), the notion of intentionality cannot 
be elucidated (verdeutlicht) otherwise than by ostension of instances (Brentano 1954: 
190-1, quoted in Textor 2017: 72).  
If Textor is right, then for Brentano it is by apprehending the right phenomenon 
in direct grasp that we truly grasp the nature of intentionality. Mark Johnston (1992) 
famously entertained the idea that the nature of colors may be best appreciated, not by 
digesting the right philosophical theory, but by looking in the right place (under the 
right conditions). Who says that only the intellect – ‘the understanding’ – can disclose 
the essences of things? Perhaps some phenomena present their nature rather to vision; 
colors would be prime candidates for this. Some contemporary philosophers of mind 
hold that whether or not this is true of color properties, it is certainly true of 
phenomenal properties – their nature is directly present to us (see, e.g., Goff 2017 
Ch.5). Brentano’s position seems to be that the nature of at least one phenomenal 
feature, intentionality, presents itself to direct acquaintance: the nature of intentionality 
is revealed in what he calls ‘inner perception.’2 Philosophical writing about intentionality 
can be useful, but only by way of helping the reader direct her attention onto the right 
phenomenon. By setting out certain contrasts and using perceptive metaphors, we may 
bring into sharper inner-perceptual relief the nature of intentionality. But this is not to 
be confused for substantive theorizing. It is just an attempt to make revelation more 
likely for the reader. For ‘just as it would be impossible to make clear to a blind man the 
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concept of red, it is impossible to make clear to someone … who has never 
apprehended himself as a thinker the concept of thinking’ (Brentano 1966: 339, quoted 
in Textor 2017: 73). 
The combination of primitivism and revelationism about a phenomenon is not 
the philosopher’s go-to hypothesis. Typically, we prefer to articulate substantive 
theoretical accounts that capture the ‘real definition’ of the phenomenon. Only after a 
long history of failed attempts do philosophers start increasingly to explore primitivist 
and/or revelationist approaches. Perhaps Brentano foresaw in the blink of an eye the 
kinds of difficulty the conceptual-analysis, naturalist-externalist, and contrastive 
phenomenal-intentionality approaches were likely to face. More likely, he took 
intentionality to be one of the most fundamental notions in his philosophical system, 
and generally thought such notions were conceptual primitives graspable only by direct 
acquaintance (Kriegel 2018: 149). From this perspective, the intensionality of mental 
verbs is a symptom of the intentionality of mental events, rather than its underlying 
nature; and the teleo-informational relation trusted by naturalists is but a correlate of 
successful (veridical) mental acts, something they may not share with failed (falsidical) 
ones. 
Textor cites four immediate advantages of the primitivist-revelationist approach 
he attributes to Brentano (2017: 75-6). However, he also finds deficient Brentano’s own 
attempts to ‘focus the mind’ on the right phenomenal feature, especially through the 
invocation of the locution ‘having an object’ and its variants. Textor argues that this 
locution does not offer a useful characterization of a whole slew of apparently 
intentional phenomena, namely, the propositional attitudes (2017 §3.3). More precisely, 
Textor argues that insofar as we take the locution to make manifest a certain notion of 
intentionality, that notion would fail as a mark of the mental, since propositional 
attitudes are mental phenomena but do not exemplify the relevant notion of 
intentionality (2017: 84). However, this is not – not directly, at any rate – an argument 
against the primitivist-revelationist approach as such. Rather, it is an argument against 
one specific attempt to use words to make vivid to the reader the nature of the kind of 
felt endogenous directedness that, according to Brentano, is the mark of the mental. It 
is possible that other words would do a better job, and it is also possible that no words 
are suited to the task even though that felt endogenous directedness really is common 
and peculiar to conscious experiences.  
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II.  The Notional Constituents of Intentionality 
 
What is the evidence that Brentano supported the primitivist-revelationist approach to 
the nature of intentionality? The two passages that Textor cites, snippets of which are 
quoted above, are unambiguous in their support; no ‘creative interpreting’ is needed to 
find these ideas in them. Still, an objector might protest that two bits of unpublished 
text is relatively little to go on.  
More deeply, one problem with Textor’s interpretation is that in other bits of 
text, Brentano does develop quite lengthy analyses of intentionality, distinguishing 
various aspects of it and bringing out quite an articulated structure in intentionality. 
Moreover, these analyses are not meant as off-the-cuff improvisations but as 
contributions to a longstanding Aristotelian tradition that Brentano very much took 
himself to work within and belong to. As I see it, this tradition is characterized by two 
connected ideas.3 First: for all the talk of an intentional relation between an act and an 
object, there is in fact no ontological distinction between the two, and accordingly 
intentionality is in reality not a relation at all, but an intrinsic modification of a conscious 
subject. Second: despite its ontological intrinsicness, intentionality does have a certain 
structure, insofar as we can analyze it in terms of certain notional constituents – 
constituents that cannot be separated in reality but which nonetheless can be 
distinguished in thought. In contributing to this tradition, Brentano is working squarely 
within the project of analyzing intentionality after all, rather than merely pointing to 
some phenomenon. This creates at least a prima facie tension with the primitivist-
revelationist reading. The purpose of this section is to bring out this tension. In the next 
section, I will consider some approaches to it. 
Brentano is all but explicit that intentionality is a non-relational property that 
simply resembles relational ones in some respects. 37 years after the appearance of the 
Psychology, he republished the last few chapters under the title The Classification of 
Mental Phenomena (Brentano 1911) and added a number of appendices, of which the 
first is explicitly concerned with this issue. It is titled ‘Mental Reference as Distinguished 
from a Relation in the Strict Sense’ and rhetorically expresses ‘doubt whether we are 
dealing with something relational here, and not rather with something relation-like 
(Relativen Ähnliches)’ (1911: 272). The basic reason to think that intentionality is non-
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relational is simply that intentional directedness can occur even when the presented 
object does not exist. Brentano is adamant that it makes no sense to say that a two-
place relation is instantiated when one of the two relata does not exist. When we speak 
in this way, as when we say that Bigfoot is bigger than a gorilla, what we mean strictly 
speaking is that if Bigfoot existed he would be bigger than a gorilla. But when we say 
that Jane is thinking of Bigfoot, we do not mean that if Bigfoot existed Jane would be 
thinking of him. So our statement in this case cannot be genuinely relational (1911: 
273). According to Brentano, what we are really doing when we say that Jane is 
thinking of Bigfoot is that we characterize Jane, we describe the kind of thinker she is at 
a certain moment – we classify her as Bigfoot-thinker (see Brentano 1933: 18, 22).4 
Although intentionality is a monadic characteristic of subjects, Brentano thinks 
we can characterize it by bringing out its constituent structure. Brentano’s ontology 
distinguishes in fact two kinds of constituent, which we may call actual and notional. 
(Brentano himself speaks of ‘parts,’ and calls the two kinds separable and distinctional 
parts. But his notion of parthood is very odd, allowing for example that a is a proper 
part of b even though b has no other proper part. I think it is much more plausible that 
what Brentano has in mind is constituency rather than parthood – cf. Chisholm 1978: 
202.) A house has several actual constituents: doors, walls, windows, and so on. They 
are actual constituents because each can exist without the others, so the house can in 
principle be broken into its several constituents. In contrast, the two-dimensional 
surface of the three-dimensional wall, although it is a distinguishable element of the 
wall, cannot exist without the wall. It is a merely notional constituent (what Brentano 
calls a ‘distinctional part’ or sometimes a ‘divisive’). In Brentano’s paradigmatic 
example, we can consider a basic physical constituent of matter – a partless subatomic 
particle – and distinguish between its left half and right halves; these, too, are merely 
notional constituents of the particle (Brentano 1982: 16).  
I belabor this point because it is central to Brentano’s understanding of 
intentionality that he takes the intentional act and the intentional object to be 
distinguishable notional constituents of intentionality (Brentano 1982: 23-4; see 
Dewalque 2013). If they were actual constituents, they would be two numerically 
distinct entities, and so intentionality would have to be a relation between them. 
Because they are merely notional constituents, however, no genuine relation is 
involved. All the same, there is structure there, structure we can characterize in terms of 
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these notional constituents. What really exists is simply the subject, variously modified 
depending on the intentional state she is in. But we can characterize these 
modifications informatively by bringing out their notional-constituent structure.  
This notional structure features not only the act and the object, but also other 
elements, notably elements of ‘intentional mode’ (what we today call more often 
‘attitude,’ as opposed to ‘content’). A belief that p is different from a desire that q not 
only insofar as p is different from q but also insofar as believing is different from 
desiring. As Brentano puts it, believing has an ‘affirmative quality,’ and this element too 
is discernable among the notional constituents of an intentional act of believing 
something (Brentano 1982: 22). Moreover, an intentional state’s structure may feature 
both determinate and determinable modes as notional constituents. Suppose that 
wondering whether p is one determinate of thinking about p; then every instance of 
wondering will feature both the ‘wondering quality’ and the ‘thinking quality’ as 
notional constituents (1982: 23).  
To summarize: Although intentionality is an intrinsic, ontologically simple feature, 
by distinguishing in thought its various notional constituents we articulate an 
intelligible, informative structural description of it. This seems to be in tension with the 
idea that intentionality is a conceptually primitive, unanalyzable notion the nature of 
which can only be grasped in direct inner awareness, not through a substantive 
theoretical account.  
 
III.  Notional Constituents and Direct Grasp 
 
We have encountered two ideas which seem to be in tension with each other, but 
which both (i) seem to be co-endorsed by Brentano and (ii) have a certain intrinsic 
plausibility to them. The first idea is that introspective analysis can yield an informative 
structural description of intentionality. The second is that intentionality is a conceptual 
primitive the nature of which cannot be grasped through theory but only when revealed 
in personal experience. What are we to make of the tension between these two 
independently intriguing ideas?  
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 One option is that the two are in fact incompatible and Brentano simply floated 
them at different times, ‘trying out’ different views so to speak. This is of course an 
epistemic possibility, but I think it is implausible in this case. For as we will see later, 
there is an interpretation that finds the right role for both direct grasp and analysis into 
notional constituents. 
A more interesting interpretation is that although introspective analysis yields an 
informative structural description of intentionality, the structure thereby described does 
not quite lie in the nature of intentionality. It characterizes intentionality, but not 
essentially so to speak. This is too is problematic, however, insofar as it is hard to 
envisage intentionality without act (state), object (content), mode (attitude), and the 
other notional constituents identified by Brentano. These seem to be necessary aspects 
of intentionality, and their necessity is at least (defeasible) evidence of their essentiality, 
that is, of their lying in the nature of intentionality.  
A third interpretation is that what is revealed to us in personal experience is only 
which phenomenon intentionality is. The deep nature of that phenomenon, though, is 
not thus revealed – it is only to be appreciated through the theoretical analysis in terms 
of notional constituents. In other words, inner perception isolates the relevant 
phenomenon, but does not present its nature. On this interpretation, what theorizing 
cannot do by itself is fix on the right phenomenon. Once the right phenomenon is 
revealed to us, though, we need theorizing to capture its nature. This third 
interpretation strikes me as very much consistent with the passages Textor relies on in 
arguing for primitivism-cum-revelationism. The only drawback in it is its sharp 
distinction between which-phenomenon-it-is and what-is-its-nature. I do not mean that 
this is in general a problematic distinction; sometimes identifying a phenomenon and 
capturing its nature are two separate affairs, two distinct epistemic achievements. 
Rather, my thought is that in the special case of intentionality, when we directly grasp 
the intentional directedness of our experiences, we do obtain a measure of insight into 
what this phenomenon is.  
My favorite interpretation, for which I will argue in the remainder of this paper, is 
this: Although inner perception does present to us the nature of intentionality, it 
presents it incompletely; and it is only the introspective analysis into notional 
constituents that provides us with a complete grasp of the nature of intentionality. It is a 
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consequence of this interpretation, I will argue, that neither primitivism nor 
revelationism is strictly speaking true of intentionality.  
To appreciate this interpretation, we need to dive into Brentano’s account of the 
relationship between perceiving (wahrnehmen) and noticing (bemerken), especially as it 
pertains to conscious experience (see especially Brentano 1982: 34-66). On Brentano’s 
view, every conscious experience includes within it an inner awareness of its own 
occurrence and character, and this inner awareness is perceptual rather than intellectual 
or cognitive in nature. In this way, every experience, and every aspect of every 
experience, is guaranteed to be ‘perceived’ by the subject. However, not every aspect 
of every experience is guaranteed to be noticed by the subject. Our overall conscious 
experience at a time is typically quite complex and involves many intermingled 
components or aspects. Currently I am visually aware of the laptop before me, as well 
as the Spanish textbook to its left; am olfactorily aware of the coffee on the table; 
auditorily aware of the indistinct hum of car engines outside; have tactile perception of 
the soles of my shoes and the chair on which I am sitting; am thinking about what to 
write next; am in a vaguely melancholic mood, and so on. Although the experience as a 
whole is manifest to my inner perception, its internal structure – its various components 
and their interrelations – is not so manifest; I need to pay attention to my experience to 
bring out this structure. In general, thinks Brentano, our experiences present 
themselves to inner perception as structured wholes not every part of which is 
necessarily noticed.  
What is it to notice a part of an experience? What Brentano (1928: 21, 1982: 36) 
tells about this is a bit underwhelming: to notice x is to move from implicit perception 
of x to explicit perception of x. Every aspect of every experience is perceived, but 
typically it is merely implicitly perceived; to notice an aspect of an experience is to 
graduate to explicit perception of it. Unfortunately, Brentano nowhere (to my 
knowledge) elucidates the distinction between implicit and explicit awareness or 
perception. Nonetheless, intuitively this proto-account of the difference between 
noticing and (mere) perceiving resonates. Consider, in the realm of visual (rather than 
inner) perception, the famed Sperling experiments, where subjects are briefly 
presented with displays of nine letters arranged in three rows of three. When the 
display lasts the right amount of time, it will be right to say that the subject sees all nine 
letters but does not notice each letter. To notice each letter, she would normally need 
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to have sufficient time to attend to each letter. For example, the display may be too 
brief for her to take full notice of the K in the upper right corner. One dimension of this 
is that the subject does not notice that it is a K, that is, is not in a position to see the K 
as a K – to conceptualize it as a K. For Brentano (1982: 50-1), it is not quite constitutive 
of noticing something that one notices what kind of thing it is (or that one is in a 
position to apply a concept to it); nor is it constitutive of noticing that it is the outcome 
of attending (1982: 39). Nonetheless, typically noticing x results from attending to it 
and enables one to conceptualize it. Regardless, just as we can draw a distinction 
between (merely) perceiving something and noticing it for visual perception, so we can 
draw this distinction for inner perception – perception of our own experiential life. The 
way Brentano would put this is that, in the Sperling experiment we envisage, the 
subject first has an implicit visual representation of the K, but only given sufficient time 
may graduate to explicit visual representation of the K; and similarly, though the 
subject is guaranteed to have an implicit inner representation of her visual-experience-
of-K, certain further conditions would have to be met for her to acquire an explicit inner 
representation of her visual-experience-of-K. 
We can see how this framework of noticing vs. (mere) perceiving is applied by 
Brentano to intentionality and its notional constituents. Obviously, these are always 
present to inner perception, but being such ubiquitous, structuring principles of 
conscious life, they are not easy to notice. (Compare: it is specially hard to notice the 
air-conditioning’s hum because it is constant; it is precisely when it stops that we notice 
it.) The way we notice intentionality is by contrasting our conscious states with 
everything else. More interestingly, the way we notice the notional constituents is by 
varying them relative to each other (Brentano 1982: 54-5). Hoping for ice cream and 
liking ice cream have the same object but differ in mode; hoping for ice cream and 
hoping for a vacation have the same mode but different objects. Although the notional 
determinables (object, mode) are invariant (there is always an intentional mode, always 
an intentional object), ruling out a phenomenal contrast between their presence and 
absence, their notional determinates (hoping, liking; ice cream, vacation) do allow for 
phenomenal contrast, since they can vary independently of one another. We thus grasp 
the notional determinates through phenomenal contrast, and grasp the determinable, 
presumably, by grasping the commonality among its determinates.  
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It is important to appreciate that the epistemological order here goes from (1) 
undifferentiated perception of the stream of consciousness, to (2) noticing of 
intentionality as such, to (3) noticing of its notional constituents. Whereas theoretically 
disinterested inner perception may present a relative booming and buzzing experiential 
confusion, and whereas a certain measure of inner-perceptual zooming-in is required to 
explicitly represent (read: notice) intentionality, a further degree of inner-perceptual 
zooming-in is required to explicitly represent the internal constituents of intentionality: 
act, object, mode, and so on. This suggests that analysis in terms of notional 
constituents does go deeper into the nature of intentionality than simple direct grasp of 
intentionality as such.  
 Despite the fact that analysis into notional constituents goes deeper into the 
nature of intentionality, inner-perceptual direct grasp of intentionality is indispensable 
for understanding its nature. For, on the one hand, intentionality is encountered only in 
inner perception, never in sense perception or in any other way. But, on the other hand, 
the notional constituents of intentionality never occur ‘outside’ or independently of it, 
and therefore we cannot hope to have an independent handle on them. We can 
elucidate what a bachelor is by defining it in terms of unmarried man, but only because 
we have an independent understanding of the notions of man and unmarried. Both the 
unmarried and the manly are not restricted to the context of bachelorhood and occur 
outside it just as well: some unmarried things are not men and some men are not 
unmarried. This enables us to have an independent grip on the (real, separable) 
constituents of bachelorhood, which constituents we can then bring together to form a 
conception of a bachelor. In contrast, intentional act and intentional object never occur 
outside the context of intentionality, so we have no independent grip on what they are. 
(Importantly, ‘intentional’ is a modifying adjective in both cases: an intentional object is 
not a kind of object any more than a toy soldier is a kind of soldier – on this see notably 
Twardowski 1894 Ch.4.) Accordingly, we cannot leverage an independent 
understanding of the notions of intentional act and intentional object (etc.) to come to 
understand the notion of intentionality the way we can leverage an independent 
understanding of the notions of man and unmarried to come to understand the notion 
of bachelor. In this sense, the analysis of intentionality into its constituents, although 
possible, does not provide quite the same kind of epistemic benefit that analysis of 
bachelorhood into its constituents does: we cannot start by grasping the constituents 
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and use this grasp to come to understand what intentionality is. On the contrary, we 
grasp intentionality as such first, through further cognitive effort, we notice its notional 
constituents. This means that understanding the nature of intentionality is impossible 
without direct inner-perceptual grasp.  
The peculiar relationship between intentionality and its notional constituents thus 
brings together two important truths. On the one hand, it is impossible to appreciate 
the nature of intentionality without direct grasp. At the same time, direct grasp of 
intentionality does not deliver an exhaustive appreciation of its nature. Deeper 
appreciation is possible by bringing out explicitly the variety of intentionality’s notional 
constituents and their interrelations. As long as one has failed to notice these notional 
constituents, one’s grip on the nature of intentionality remains incomplete – even if one 
enjoys direct grasp (even explicit direct grasp) of intentionality itself, intentionality as a 
whole.  
This, then, is my favored interpretation of the relationship between direct grasp 
and analysis into notional constituents as manners of understanding the nature of 
intentionality. This interpretation puts in question primitivism and revelationism as 
characterizing Brentano’s position. Primitivism is the thesis that intentionality is 
conceptually primitive in the sense that it is unanalyzable. On our interpretation, on the 
contrary, there is a kind of analysis of intentionality’s notional structure that is not only 
possible but necessary for a complete appreciation of its nature. As for revelationism, 
this is the thesis that the nature of ‘intentionality is fully revealed to us in its 
instantiation’ (Textor 2017: 74). Whether this is true on our interpretation depends on 
what one means by ‘fully revealed.’ If the term ‘revealed’ is taken to imply that no 
cognitive effort needs to be mobilized, it is clearly not true that the nature of 
intentionality is revealed to us. But nor is it true if no cognitive effort is demanded that 
goes beyond noticing intentionality itself. For on our interpretation, a full appreciation 
of the nature of intentionality requires the kind of cognitive effort that would go deeper 
into the structure of intentionality and bring out its notional structure.  
At the same time, our interpretation can make sense of the two key passages 
supporting Textor’s primitivist-revelationist interpretation, those where Brentano writes 
that ‘the notion of intentionality cannot be elucidated otherwise than by ostension of 
instances’ (1954: 190-1) and that ‘just as it would be impossible to make clear to a blind 
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man the concept of red, it is impossible to make clear to someone … who has never 
apprehended himself as a thinker the concept of thinking’ (1966: 339). For upon 
rereading, all these passages insist on is that direct grasp of intentionality is a sine qua 
non for appreciating the nature of intentionality. They contain nothing to exclude the 
possibility that such direct grasp, unsupplemented by analysis into notional 
constituents, may yet offer an incomplete portrait of the nature of intentionality. But 
this, on our interpretation of Brentano, is precisely what happens with intentionality: 
direct grasp of intentionality is (i) indispensable but (ii) incomplete. Complete 
understanding of the nature of intentionality requires noticing direct grasp not only of 
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1 The notion of underived intentionality alludes to the idea that although many things have 
aboutness, some things have it by courtesy of other things whereas some have it in and of 
themselves, that is, nonderivatively. For example, a traffic signs means ‘rail crossing ahead’ 
because we decided that that is what it would mean, whereas the decision is about what it is 
about in and of itself. Not everybody accepts this distinction, of course, but here I assume it.  
 
2 Brentano’s notion of inner perception is not quite the same as introspection. But the various 




3 The two ideas can be found in Aristotle himself, in my opinion in 425b26–426a5 (in De Anima 
3.2), but also, for instance, in section 68 of Book 1 of Maimonides’ Guide to the Perplexed. I 
cannot go into these historical matters here with any seriousness. 
 
4 Note well: for Brentano, wherever there is intentionality there is an intentional object, since 
intentionality is inherently a form of directedness. What there may not be is a presented object 
– a worldly object being presented by the intentional state. It follows that the intentional object 
≠ the presented object – see Brentano 1930: 77. 
 
5 For help with developing the ideas in §3 of this paper, I am grateful to Anna Giustina. 
 
